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THE PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY
REORGANIZATION PROVISIONS: A
COMPARISON OF THE CURRENT LAW WITH
CHAPTER 11 of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266
Sheridan Downey III*
Jeffrey T. Ferriell**
Roland D. Pfeiffer***
INTRODUCTION

During the last ten years, there has been a great deal of
debate, in Congress as well as among jurists and other legal
scholars, over the prospect of a general revision of the bankruptcy laws of the United States.' This decade of discussion has
produced a number of proposed revisions,2 but, until recently,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law; B.A., 1963,
Stanford University; J.D., 1966, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley.
** Graduate Teaching Assistant, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana,
School of Law; B.S., 1975, Ohio State University; J.D., 1978, University of Santa Clara
School of Law.
*** Third year law student, University of Santa Clara School of Law; B.S., 1973,
University of Nebraska; M.B.A., 1976, University of Santa Clara.
1. As early as 1968, Congress was conducting hearings pertinent to a general
revision of the Bankruptcy Act. In July of 1968, the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings related to a broad revision of
the law of bankruptcy. Hearingson S.J. Res. 100 Before the Subcomm. on Bankruptcy
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Seas. (1968). In addition, a year
later the House Judiciary Committee held similar hearings. Hearings on S.J. Res. 88
Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Seas.
(1969). Both sets of hearings provided the background for the establishment of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. See COmm'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED

STATES

Part I, at 2, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)

[hereinafter cited as

COMMISSION REPORT].

2. In 1973 the Bankruptcy Commission, which had been created three years
earlier by Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970), reported a proposed revision of the
Bankruptcy Act. Donnelly, The New (Proposed?) Bankruptcy Act: The Development
of its Structural Provisions and Their Impact on the Interests of Consumer Debtors,
18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 291, 291 n.6 (1978); see COMISSION REPORT, supranote 1, Part
II, for the text of the Commission's proposed revision which was introduced in Congress
originally as H.R. 10792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and again in 1975 as
H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). In response to the Commission's bill,
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges proposed an alternate bill introduced
first as H.R. 16643 and S. 4046, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. (1974) and subsequently as H.R.
32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For a treatment of the differences between
the Judges' proposal and that of the Bankruptcy Commission, see Bare, The Proposed
Bankruptcy Acts, 6 CUM. L. REv. 287 (1975); Bull, Competing Proposals for a New
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no bill had received the approval of either wing of Congress. In
February, 1978, however, the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 82001 and thus forwarded the burden of reforming the
bankruptcy act to the Senate. The Senate now must determine
whether to accept H.R. 8200 as it was reported by the House,
to amend the House bill or to adopt S. 2266, a modified version
of the original House bill.'

Among the changes from the current law that would occur
upon implementation of either version of the bankruptcy revision, one of the most apparent would be the consolidation of
the three existing business reorganization chapters into a single
proceeding.5 Although both H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 would conBankruptcy Act: Some Substantive Differences in Procedure, 52 J. URB. L. 929 (1975);
Coogan, Broude & Glatt, Comments on Some Reorganization Provisions of the Pending Bankruptcy Bills, 30 Bus. LAW. 1149 (1975); Lee, A Critical Comparison of the
Commission Bill and the Judges Bill for the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49
AM. BANKR. L. J. 1 (1975).
A good history of the two proposals can be found in Cyr, Setting the Record
Straight for a Comprehensive Revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANKR.
L. J. 99 (1975).
3. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Bill], was
passed by the House on February 1, 1978. 124 CONG. REc. H457-58, H478 (daily ed.
Feb. 1, 1978). The House Bill was originally introduced as H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977), and later as H.R. 7330, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
4. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S 18244 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Bill). The differences between the House and Senate bills with respect
to bankruptcy reorganizations will be the subject of this article. There are, however, a
number of other differences between the bills that will have to be resolved prior to the
enactment of a general revision of the Bankruptcy Act. Perhaps the most significant
of these differences deals with the structure of the bankruptcy courts and the status
of the bankruptcy judges. See generally Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Hearings on
S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited
as 1977 Senate Hearings].
5. This consolidation is in accordance with the recommendations of the Bankruptcy Commission. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 23. The Commission's recommendation was based upon the need for a single, flexible reorganization procedure
that could be used to shape whatever relief was appropriate given the facts and circumstances of each case. Id. at 248. For a discussion of the ways in which the existing
bankruptcy reorganization chapters did not, in the Commission's view, suit this need,
see id. at 245-48. Some, however, have disagreed over the wisdom of abolishing the
differences between Chapters X and XI of the current law. See Lee, supra note 2 at
39-41; Levit, A Statement on the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 81 CoM. L. J. 93, 94 (1976);
Seidman, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973-A Critique, 79 COM. L. J. 297, 300 (1974);
Weintraub & Crames, Critique of Chapter VII and Related Sections of the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 48 AM. BANKR. L. J. 1, 1-15, 27-28 (1974); Weintraub & Levin,
Chapter VII (Reorganizations) as Proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap between Theory and Reality, 47 AM. BANKR. L. J. 323 (1973). See also King,
The Business Reorganization Chapter of the ProposedBankruptcy Code-Or Whatever Happened to Chapters X, XI and XII, 78 COM. L.J. 429 (1973), which raises a
number of questions with respect to the consolidation of Chapters X-XII, but does not
indicate approval or disapproval of their combination into a single proceeding.
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solidate existing Chapters X, XI, and XII into a broader, more
flexible Chapter 11, there are, nevertheless, a number of important differences between the two versions of the proposed business reorganization chapter. Among those differences, the Senate's special provisions governing the treatment of publicly
held companies6 looms ominously as a potential barrier to
agreement between the House and Senate in the area of business reorganizations. 7 Whether an agreement on some of the
more political differences evident in the two proposals will
yield agreement on the substantive issues remains to be seen.
At this time, politics, jealousies and the territorial imperative threaten to delay Congressional action for a longer period
of time than is customarily devoted to haggling over technicalities of two bills. The great stumbling block to the Senate's
passage of H.R. 8200 is, without doubt, the House's proposal
to separate the bankruptcy courts from the federal district
courts and to staff the bankruptcy courts with Article III,' lifetenured judges
Such influential and prestigious organizations as the Commission on The Bankruptcy Laws, the National Bankruptcy
Conference, the Commercial Law League of America, the
American Banker's Association and the American Bar Association have given unified support to a separate and independent
bankruptcy court.1" The Chief Justice of the United States and
the Judicial Conference, however, have adamantly opposed
this proposal."
6. As will be seen, the Senate Bill provides for special treatment of publicly-held
companies. See notes 99-103 and accompanying text infra. In this regard, the Senate
Bill follows the Commission's bill which proposed standards, reminiscent of Chapter
X, providing special protective measures for the reorganization of publicly-held companies. See Trost & King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform, Circa 1977, 33 Bus. LAw.
489, 530 (1978).
7. Compare 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 619-20 (supplemental statement of the Commercial Law League of America) and id. at 621-24 (statement of Philip
A. Loomis, Jr.) with id. at 576 (statements of Robert J. Grimmig & John W. Ingraham).
8. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1 provides:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
9. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding §§ 151-153 to 11 U.S.C.).
10. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977
HOUSE REPORT].

11.

Trost & King, supra note 6, at 494.
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The minority opposition is thought by many to have sufficient influence in the Senate to ensure defeat of the life tenure
provisions of H.R. 8200. Under S. 2266 the bankruptcy courts
will remain adjuncts of the federal district courts and bankruptcy judges will be appointed for twelve-year terms by 'the
judicial council of each circuit. 2
District court judges have long been noted for their lack
of interest in bankruptcy proceedings. 3 One would expect reorganization proceedings, which demand both expertise and
constant attention, to be as welcome as the plague when placed
before a district judge. At the outset, then, Judicial Conference
opposition to H.R. 8200 is surprising. Little light is shed on the
matter by the objections put forth by the Conference:
the creation of a separate court to provide services in the
limited field of bankruptcy, as a specialized court, is, in
the opinion of this Committee, contrary to all trends of
modern judicial administration. The creation of a separate
court structure for bankruptcy cases would decrease the
flexibility of the administration and the overall efficiency
of the Federal courts."
The historical justification for the Conference's opposition
is of doubtful validity or relevance." One can only speculate
over why the Conference felt that formal separation of the
bankruptcy courts from the district courts would make either
inflexible or inefficient.'"
The unfortunate truth may be that the Judicial Conference opposes life tenure for bankruptcy judges only because
there exists an instinctive reluctance to part with or share any
presently vested interests or powers. Whether the bloodlines of
the Senate have inherited this defense mechanism will likely
determine the date and the pervasiveness of any bankruptcy
12. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 201 (adding § 771(a), (c) to 28 U.S.C.). If the
bankruptcy courts are not given article III status but are granted the jurisdiction and
powers now under consideration in H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, important Constitutional
issues may have to be dealt with. An excellent discussion of these issues appears in
1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7-87.
13. See, e.g., 1977 HOuSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 14.
14. Special Committee of the Judicial Conference Review H.R. 6, Preliminary
Report 1 (1977).
15. Three article III courts and one specialized court have been established during the last 25 years; the Court of Claims, Act of July 28, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-158, 67
Stat. 226; the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-755, 72 Stat. 848; the Customs Court, Act of July 14, 1956, Pub. L. No. 703, 70
Stat. 532; and the Tax Court, Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat.
730.
16. See 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 28-29.
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reform legislation.
Assuming, however, that these political differences will be
resolved in the near future, this article's focus will be on the
substantive provisions of the two bills as they relate to business
reorganizations. The article will first examine a number of general provisions of the proposed legislation which will be applicable to the more specialized reorganization chapter of the new
law. The authors will then go on to compare the proposed reorganization provisions of the House and Senate bills and examine
the changes in the current law that would result from an enactment of either bill. In the aftermath of this comparison and
examination, the authors conclude that the House version's
flexible approach to bankruptcy reorganizations is preferable
to the Senate's more restrictive provisions which purport to
provide greater protection for public investors than the House
bill.
PROVISIONS GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO ALL BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS

Except for the dischargeability legislation of 1970,'" the
substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Act are now forty
years old. The bills before Congress contain much new law
applicable to both ordinary bankruptcy and to reorganizations.
Although the authors' principal concern is with the specific
provisions of Chapters 11 of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, the wholesale revisions of the remaining Chapters ought not to be ignored. 8 The authors shall examine a few provisions of Chapters
1, 3, and 5 of the House and Senate Bills which change current
law and which are expected to influence the course of or the
practicioner's decision to initiate a Chapter 11 case.
Jurisdiction
Under the Bankruptcy Act, so-called summary jurisdiction resides in the bankruptcy court to hear and determine
17. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990 (1970).
18. Both versions of the proposed Bankruptcy Act specify: "Except as provided
in section 1161 of this title, chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under
chapter 7, 11 or 13 of this title." House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 103(a) to 11
U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 103(a) to 11 U.S.C.). Section 1161
of the new bankruptcy law makes certain provisions inapplicable to railroad reorganization cases. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1161 to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1161 to 11 U.S.C.).
For an analysis of the impact of the proposed legislation upon consumers, see
Donnelly, supra note 2.
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administrative matters and, in many instances, controversies
respecting property in the actual or constructive possession of
the estate." Absent such possessory interest the exercise of
summary jurisdiction is dependent upon consent, express or
implied, of the parties.2" In an effort to streamline the administration of liquidation and reorganization cases the Senate and
House bills propose to vest original jurisdiction "of all civil
proceedings arising under or related to cases under Title 11" in
the bankruptcy courts."
The venue provisions of H.R. 8200 dig a not-so-shallow
grave for the geographically distant creditor, claimant or obligor of the debtor, trustee or debtor-in-possession. With minor
exceptions, "a proceeding arising under or related to a case
under Title 11 may be commenced in the bankruptcy court in
which such case is pending."" The principal exceptions to this
rule are those involving claims of less than $1000 or consumer
debts of less than $5000. Money judgments on such claims
must be sought "in the bankruptcy court for the district in
which a defendant resides." 3
The saving grace, if any, for the trade creditor in, let us
say, Carson City, Nevada who is alleged to have received a
$1,200 preference from a New York City debtor-in-possession
lies in the liberal change of venue provisions of H.R. 8200. A
venue change is permitted, "in the interest of justice and for
the convenience of the parties." 4
H.R. 8200 not only opens the bankruptcy court to trustee
or debtor initiated cases now relegated to state courts, but goes
one step further: certain cases which are frequent sources of
19. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 2, 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1970); Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481 (1940).
20. See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
21. House Bill, supra note 3, § 243 (adding § 1471(b) to 28 U.S.C.). An equally
broad grant of jurisdiction appears in the Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 202 (amending
§ 1334(b) of 28 U.S.C.).
22. House Bill, supra note 3, § 243 (adding § 1473(a) to 28 U.S.C.). The Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 203 (adding § 1391(h) to 28 U.S.C.) retains the current venue
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)-(f) (1970). Thus, the defendant's residence or the
district in which the claim arose will be the normal situs of the action.
23. House Bill, supra note 3, § 243 (adding § 1473(b) to 28 U.S.C.).
24. House Bill, supra note 3, § 243 (adding § 1475 to 28 U.S.C.) (derived from
FED. R. BANKR. P. 116, 782.)

It would be no surprise if section 1475 becomes a wellspring of pyrrhic victories.
Counsel for debtors and creditors will agree that the ability to bring contested claims
from around the country before a single forum is of enormous practical importance.
Many debtor decisions to initiate reorganization cases may turn on this jurisdictional
windfall.
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collateral litigation to bankruptcy proceedings, but which did
not involve the trustee or debtor-in-possession as a direct
claimant, are expressly treated by the House bill. 5 The proposed revision would overturn Caplin v. MarineMidland Grace
Trust Co. of New York 2" by allowing the trustee or debtor-inpossession to succeed to certain choses in action held not by the
debtor but by "a creditor, a class of creditors," or "equity security holders" of the debtor. 7 The circumstances under which
such choses in action will pass to the representative of the
estate are intricate," but not far-fetched. Reorganization cases,
in particular, may provide a convenient if unexpected forum29
for resolving securities fraud claims of equity security holders
against third parties unrelated to the debtor.
Initiating the Proceeding
Under both proposed bills, eligible debtors"° may commence a liquidation or reorganization proceeding voluntarily.'
Involuntary cases are commenced by three or more qualified
creditors holding claims aggregating at least $5000 over and
above any liens securing their claims. 2 If the debtor has fewer

than twelve creditors a single qualified creditor may initiate
the case.3 These provisions represent only modest change from
25. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 544(c)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
26. 406 U.S. 416 (1972).
27. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 544(c)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
28. The chose in action must not pass to the trustee (or debtor in possession)
under any other provision of title 11; any recovery must go to the original claimholders
(less expenses) and thereby benefit the estate by reducing the demands on the estate
of such claimholders; the defendant in the action must not have a likely subrogation
claim against the estate; and the suit must otherwise be in the best interest of the
estate. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 544(c)(1)(A)-(D), (c)(3) to 11 U.S.C.).
29. The trustee or debtor-in-possession must file an action arising under § 544(c)
in the bankruptcy court of the district in which the case might have been brought
without regard to the bankruptcy venue provisions. House Bill, supra note 3, § 243
(adding § 1473(c) to 28 U.S.C.).
30. See text accompanying notes 88-103, infra.
31. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 301 to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra
note 4, § 101 (adding § 301 to 11 U.S.C.).
32. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 303(b)(1) to ll U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 303(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.). A creditor is qualified to act as
a petitioning creditor if the creditor is an entity holding a claim against the debtor that
is not contingent as to liability. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 303(b)(1) to
11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 303(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.). Indenture trustees representing such holders are similarly qualified. House Bill, supra note
3, § 101 (adding § 303(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding §
303(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
33. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 303(b)(2) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 303(b)(2) to 11 U.S.C.). The Bankruptcy Commission's
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current law.3"
The grounds upon which a court will enter an "order for
relief"3 in an involuntary case, however, are brand new. Gone
are the familiar "acts of bankruptcy."3 In their place the petitioning creditor(s) must demonstrate either that "the debtor is
generally unable to pay" his debts as they come due" or that
the equivalent of a general assignment for benefit of creditors
has taken place within 90 days of the date the petition was
filed.3"
The major impact of the proposed revisions upon reorganization cases lies in the fact that creditors of both small and
large business, corporate or otherwise, will have a choice of
involuntary relief. At present, no involuntary cases may be
brought under Chapters X 35 and XII' ° of the Bankruptcy Act.
Only Chapter X provides creditors with an alternative to an
involuntary liquidation. 1 Creditors electing to file involuntary
cases 42 will also be pleased with their lightened burden of
bill had suggested that a single creditor with an unsecured claim of at least $10,000.00
be authorized to file an involuntary petition without regard to the total number of
creditors. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, Part I, § 4-205(b) at 74.
34. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 59(b), 11 U.S.C. § 95(b)(1970), noncontingent, provable claims aggregating $500.00 or more are eligible to file or join in
filing an involuntary petition. A single creditor may do so only if the debtor's creditors
are less than 12.
35. "Order for relief" under the proposed revision is roughly equivalent to an
order of adjudication in an ordinary bankruptcy or an order approving an involuntary
petition under Chapter X of the present law. See House Bill, supra note 3, § 101
(adding § 301 to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 301 to 11 U.S.C.).
See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 1(2), 142, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(2), 542 (1970).
36. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 3a, 11 U.S.C. § 21a (1970).
37. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 303(h)(1) to 11 U.S.C.). The Senate
bill differs slightly in that it would be enough to show that the debtor "has failed to
pay a major portion of his debts" as they come due. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101
(adding § 303(h)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
38. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 303(h)(2) toll U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 303(h)(2) to 11 U.S.C.).
39. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 321-322, 11 U.S.C. §§ 721-722 (1970).
40. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 421-422, 11 U.S.C. §§ 821-822 (1970).
41. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 106(9), 126, 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(9), 526 (1970).
42. The impetus to file an involuntary liquidation case is generally provided by
creditors' desires to equalize the distribution of a debtor's estate. See Donnelly, supra
note 2, at 297. Preferential and fraudulent transfers can be recovered, certain liens may
be set aside, and automatic restraints are imposed upon competing creditors. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 60, 67a, d, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107a, d, (1970); FED. R. BANKR. P.
401,601.
Under the proposed law, creditors need not demand a liquidation but, for example, might request a change in management through the vehicle of an involuntary
reorganization proceeding. Similar avoiding and injunctive powers will exist in a Chapter 11 case as in a liquidation case under Chapter 7 of the proposed enactments. See
notes 62-85 and accompanying text, infra.
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proof-in most cases a showing of equitable insolvency.
The creditors' sword, twice sharpened, must be wielded
carefully, for the proposed bills authorize the court to grant
judgment against petitioning creditors for costs and attorney's
43
fees if the petition is dismissed by the court. If a trustee was
appointed prior to the hearing on the petition," damages proximately caused by the debtor's ouster from possession may also
4
be awarded.45 If creditors file their petition in bad faith, " all
damages proximately caused by the filing and punitive damages may be awarded."
The creditor's burden in initiating an involuntary case,
thus, is easily fulfilled. Too easily, Congress must have
thought, for even where petitioning creditors have otherwise
carried their burden, the court may dismiss the petition or
suspend the proceedings if, "the interests of creditors and the
debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension.""
Property of the Estate
State law now controls many questions as to what property
will comprise the debtor's estate.4" Dependence upon state law,
50
for the most part, is eradicated by both bills. Except for
spendthrift trusts"' and powers which the debtor might exercise
43. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 303(i)(1)(A), (B) to 11 U.S.C.);
Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 303(i)(1)(A), (B) to 11 U.S.C.). Compare
these identical provisions with Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 69a, 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1970)
which allows recovery of counsel fees and damages only when a receiver has been
appointed. See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 115(e).
44. Such appointment will be possible in some reorganization cases under the
conditions which are slightly different under each bill. See text accompanying notes
144-57, infra.
45. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 303(i)(1)(C) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 303(i)(1)(C) to 11 U.S.C.).
46. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 146, 11 U.S.C. § 546 (1970).
47. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 303(i)(2) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 303(i)(2) to 11 U.S.C.).
48. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 305(a)(1) to ll U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 305(a)(1) to 11 U.S.C.). This abstention provision is
designed to permit out of court work-outs or the continuation of previously instituted
litigation, such as equity receiverships. See 1977 House REPORT, supra note 10, at 324.
An order of dismissal under this Section will not be "reviewable on appeal or
otherwise." House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 305(c) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 305(c) to 11 U.S.C.).
49. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
50. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 541(a) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 541(a) to 11 U.S.C.).
51. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 541(c)(2) to 11 U.S.C.). S. 2266
however, brings spendthrift trusts into the estate, excluding only "the income reason-

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

solely for the benefit of third parties,52 "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case" will pass to the estate. 3
Commercial leases often contain a so-called "bankruptcy
clause" which gives a lessor the option of terminating the lease
upon the filing, by or against the lessee, of any proceeding in
bankruptcy. Section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act" makes such
clauses enforceable against the estate.55
Retention of leasehold interests are usually vital to the
continued operation of a debtor's business and thus to the
success of the reorganization proceeding. This fact has
prompted some courts to sidestep the plain wording of section
70b5" on "policy" grounds.5" Consistent with the treatment of
secured creditors and the use of their collateral," the proposed
legislation invalidates lease provisions triggered by the debtor's
insolvency or "the commencement of a case under this title."5'
If, at the time a case is commenced, the lessor already has
a right of termination such right remains prima facie enforceable. Leases, however, are executory contracts and are subject
to the provisions of section 365(b)(1) of the proposed bankruptcy law. 0 Under that provision a lease may be reinstated by
a trustee or debtor-in-possession by: 1) curing the default (or
providing adequate assurance of prompt cure); 2) compensatably necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents." Senate Bill, supra
note 4, § 101 (adding § 541(c)(2) to 11 U.S.C.).
52. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 541(b) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 541(b) to 11 U.S.C.).
53. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 541(a)(1) toll U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 541(a)(1) to 11 U.S.C.). However, § 522(b) of the new
bankruptcy law expressly overrides § 541(a) in allowing the debtor to exclude exempt
property from the estate. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 522(a) to 11 U.S.C.);
Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 522(a) to 11 U.S.C.).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
55. Chapters I through VII of the Act apply to cases brought under Chapter X,
XI and XII. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 102,302, 402, 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 702,802 (1970).
56. "[An express covenant that an assignment by operation of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party thereto . . . shall terminate the lease or give the other party
an election to terminate the same is enforceable." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70b, 11
U.S.C. § 110b (1970).
57. See Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202, 202-06
(2d Cir. 1974) (termination avoided because of substantial injustice to the debtor); In
re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964) (termination avoided because
counter to public interest and inequitable windfall to lessor).
58. See text accompanying notes 126-136, infra.
59. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 541(c)(1)(B) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 541(c)(1)(B) to 11 U.S.C.).
60. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 365(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 365(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
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ing the lessor for actual pecuniary loss (or providing adequate
assurance of prompt compensation); and 3) providing adequate
assurance of future performance under the executory contract.6
Preferences and Floating Liens
Of special interest to business debtors and their creditors
is the treatment of preferential transfers in the Senate and
House bills. The familiar elements of a preference are little
changed.2 In place of the longstanding four-month rule, how3
ever, a ninety day period has been selected.
Trade creditors and lenders will be displeased with two
major changes from current law. The recovery of preferential
transfers will no longer be dependent upon the transferee's actual or constructive knowledge of the debtor's insolvency. 4 Insolvency at the time of the transfer is still necessary, but is
presumed to exist for the ninety days prior to the time the
petition was filed."e
The foregoing proposals regarding recovery of preferential
transfers, coupled with the expansion of bankruptcy court ju61. S. 2266 would not apply § 365(b)(1) of the new bankruptcy law to liquidation
cases, to leases entered into before the effective date of the legislation, to leases of
property not essential to the debtor's business, or in cases where lease payments are
substantially less than the fair rental value of the property. Senate Bill, supra note 4,
§ 101 (adding § 365(b)(3)(A)-(D) to 11 U.S.C.).
62. As under current Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96a(1) (1970), there
must be: (1) a transfer of the debtor's property (2) to or for the benefit of a creditor
(3) on account of an antecedent debt (4) made while the debtor is insolvent (5) that
enables the creditor to receive more than he would have (without the transfer) in a
bankruptcy liquidation and (6) the transfer must have occurred within the statutory
period. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 547(b)(4)(A) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 547(b)(4)(A) to 11 U.S.C.).
63. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 547(b)(4)(A) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 547(b)(4)(A) to 11 U.S.C.). Special provisions deal
with preferential transfers to "insiders" as defined in House Bill, supra note 3, § 101
(adding § 101(24) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 101(25) to
11 U.S.C.). The 90 day period is extended to 1 year. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101
(adding § 547(b)(4)(B)(i) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding §
547(b)(4)(B)(i) to 11 U.S.C.).
64. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 547(b) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 547(b) to 11 U.S.C.). Compare the proposed revision with
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 60b, 11 U.S.C. § 96b (1970).
In the case of insiders only, recovery of preferential transfers occurring between
the 90th day and one year before filing of the petition is dependent upon proof of the
insider's knowledge of the debtor's insolvency. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding
§ 547(b)(4)(B)(ii) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding §
547(b)(4)(B)(ii) to 11 U.S.C.).
65. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 547(0 to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 547(f) to 11 U.S.C.).
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risdiction,5 should substantially increase the trustee's ability
and motivation to recover funds for the estate.
A slight inroad in the trustee's recovery power will result
from a new twist in the treatment of certain "antecedent
debts." Both versions of the prepared law bar recovery of payments on debts "incurred in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs" of both the debtor and transferee, 7 made
within "45 days after such debt was incurred,

6 8 if

the payment

was made in the ordinary course of business of both parties.
A new test is provided for the avoidance of floating liens
upon inventory 0 and receivables. 7 The ratio decendi, although
not the holdings of Dubay v. Williams72 and Grain Merchants
of Indiana, Inc. v- Union Bank & Savings Co."3 are swept away
by the proposed legislation. Both bills permit the avoidance of
perfected security interests in after-acquired collateral only
where the secured party has improved its position during the
ninety-day period.7
Avoidance of Security Interests
The so-called "strong arm""5 clause, section 70c of the
Bankruptcy Act, 6 is incorporated in the Senate and House bills
with some welcome claryfying language. Both bills77 allow the
trustee or debtor-in-possession to avoid most security interests
66. See text accompanying notes 19-29, supra.
67. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 547(c)(2)(A) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 547(c)(2)(A) to 11 U.S.C.).
68. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 547(c)(2)(B) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 547(c)(2)(B) to 11 U.S.C.).
69. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 547(c)(2)(C) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 547(c)(2)(C) to 11 U.S.C.).
70. "Inventory" is defined at House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 547(a)(1)
to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 547(a)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
71. "Receivable" is defined at House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 547(a)(3)
to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 547(a)(3) to 11 U.S.C.).
72. 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
73. 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969). Dubay and Grain Merchants concluded that no
preference had in fact occurred. The Senate and House bills reach the same result by
making the "preference" nonrecoverable.
74. Since the key dates are the date the petition is filed and the 90th day before,
a creditor whose collateral initially falls in value (during the 90 day period) and then
rises shortly before the filing date will not have received a recoverable preference,
unless, of course, the increase in value carries the collateral above the value 90 days
before filing.

75.

See 4A
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70.45, at 559 (14th ed. 1940).

76. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
77. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 544(a) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 544(a) to 11 U.S.C.).
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which are not perfected at the time a case is commenced. The
trustee is given the rights of: 1) a creditor on a simple contract
with a judicial lien on property of the debtor on the date the
case is commenced;7" 2) a creditor with a writ of execution
against the property of the debtor unsatisfied on the date of
filing,79 and 3) a bona fide purchaser of the debtor's real property as of the date of the petition. 0
In no case does it matter whether any such creditor actually exists on the date the petition is filed." Any actual or
constructive knowledge of the security interest on the part of
the trustee or actual creditors is similarly unimportant. 2 Rejecting the Bankruptcy Commission's recommendation that
Moore v. Bay 3 be overturned, 4 the proposed revisions allow the
trustee to set aside transfers of the debtor's property which are
voidable by any actual unsecured creditor
of the estate and to
85
estate.
entire
the
of
benefit
the
do so for
THE GENERAL EFFECT OF A CONSOLIDATED, SINGLE
REORGANIZATION CHAPTER

Though the changes in Chapters 1, 3, and 5 are important,
perhaps the most significant changes in the law of bankruptcy
reorganization that would be implemented by either H.R. 8200
or S. 2266, is the consolidation of Chapters X, XI and XII of
the current Bankruptcy Act into a single reorganization proceeding. 6 Among the effects of such a consolidation would.be
78. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 544(a)(I) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 544(a)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
79. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 544(a)(2) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 544(a)(2) to 11 U.S.C.).
80. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 544(a)(3) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 544(a)(3) to 11 U.S.C.).
81. The proposed revision would thereby overturn Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards,
304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962), which held that section 70c required the existence of an
actual creditor (on the date of bankruptcy who could avoid an unperfected lien.
82. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 544(a) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 544(a) to 11 U.S.C.).
83. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
84. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, Part II § 4-604(b)(1) at 160-61.
85. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 544(b) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 544(b) to 11 U.S.C.).
86. Chapter 11 of the new bankruptcy act would also apply to railroad reorganizations which are currently governed by § 77 of the current act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
However, the proposed revision continues to recognize that railroad reorganizations
involve issues that are peculiar to railroad corporations and thus contains a separate
subchapter devoted entirely to procedures and standards that would apply solely in
those cases. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding §§ 1161-1172 to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
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the elimination of two barriers, extant in the current law,
which in many cases operate to prevent a financially troubled
business from acquiring the kind of relief that is needed for its
rehabilitation. The first of these barriers is the eligibility restrictions which prohibit certain business entities from obtaining relief under current Chapters X and XII. The second barrier is the restriction on the ability of a plan of reorganization
to affect secured debtors under Chapter XI.
This section of the article will proceed to review these two
types of restrictions before going on to analyze the impact of
their elimination under proposed Chapter 11. In addition, although the differences between H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 with
respect to these restrictions are few, it will be seen that one
important difference between them is the special provisions in
the Senate bill alone, for the treatment of "public companies." 7
Eligibility for Relief
The current Bankruptcy Act permits only certain forms of
business entities to obtain relief under each of its reorganization chapters. Thus, the rehabilitative provisions of Chapter X
are available only to corporations, 8 and although the Bankruptcy Act contains a rather broad definition of what qualifies
as a corporation,89 most partnerships and individually owned
businesses are ineligible for relief under Chapter X.10
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding §§ 1161-1172 to 11 U.S.C.); see 1977 HousE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 223, 422-25.
87. See notes 99-103 and accompanying text infra.
88. Section 106(5) of the current Bankruptcy Act defines "debtor" for the purposes of Chapter X as "a corporation by or against which a petition has been filed
under [Chapter X]." 11 U.S.C. § 506(5) (1970) (emphasis added). Section 126 further
provides that "[a] corporation . . . may . . . file a petition under this chapter." 11
U.S.C. § 526 (1970); see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 4.05[1], at 786-87 (14th ed. 1940).
89. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 1(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1970) provides that:
"[clorporation" shall include all bodies having any of the powers
and privileges of private corporations not possessed by individuals or
partnerships and shall include partnership associations organized under
laws making the capital subscribed alone responsible for the debts of the
association, joint-stock companies, unincorporated companies and associations, and any business conducted by a trustee or trustees wherein
beneficial interest or ownership is evidenced by certificate or other written instrument.
Because of this broad definition, Chapter X is applicable to many forms of business
entities that are not commonly referred to as corporations. See 6 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY
2.07[1], at 314-16 (14th ed. 1940).
90. The requirement that a Chapter X petition be filed "in good faith" operates
to prevent otherwise ineligible entities from altering their form of organization merely
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Alternatively, under Chapter XI any "person who could
become a bankrupt under [section 4] of [the Bankruptcy
Act]"' may file a petition for relief.2 The language of this
chapter encompasses natural persons, partnerships, and corporations other than those specifically excluded or treated elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Act."
The eligibility requirements in Chapter XII relate not only
to the form of organization of the debtor, but also to the type
of property which secures the debtor's obligations. Section
406(6) of the Bankruptcy Act operates to permit any person
"other than a corporation as defined in [the Bankruptcy] Act
. . .who is the legal or equitable owner of real property or a
chattel real which is security for any debt" to petition the court
for rehabilitation under Chapter XII11 As a result, Chapter XII
is available only to individuals and partnerships who own real
property which is security for any debt, whether owned by the
Chapter XII petitioner or by another. 5
Chapters X and XII, then, place significant restrictions
upon the kinds of debtors who may apply for relief. In contrast,
Chapter XI, on its face, would appear to be the most flexible
among the reorganization proceedings. As will be seen, however, the imposition of other restrictions in Chapter XI upon
in order to become eligible for relief under Chapter X. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 141,
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1970); e.g., In re Metropolitan Realty Corp., 433 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1008 (1971); see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1.07[2], at
1050-54 (14th ed. 1940). But see In re Northand Construction Co., 560 F.2d 756 (7th
Cir. i977), where the court indicated that it might have found the debtor's petition to
be in good faith, notwithstanding an incorporation of the debtor's business solely to
qualify for Chapter X, had there been a showing of the "need which a reorganization
under Chapter X is ordinarily designed to serve." Id. at 760. See notes 184-85 and
accompanying text, infra.
91. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 306(3), 11 U.S.C. § 706(3) (1970).
92. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 2.09 at 82-84 (14th ed. 1940).
Section 4a indicates who may become voluntarily bankrupt and § 4b indicates
who may become involuntarily bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 4a, b, 11 U.S.C. §

22a, b (1970). See 8
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2.09 at 82-83 (14th ed. 1940).

93. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 2.09 at 82-84 (14th ed. 1940). Excluded under §
4 are "municipal, railroad, insurance [and] banking corporation[s]," as well as
"building and loan association[s]." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 4a, 11 U.S.C. § 22a
(1970). However, municipalities and railroad corporations are treated elsewhere in the
Bankruptcy Act. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 77, 81-83, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205, 401-403
(1970).
94. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 406(6), 11 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1970); 9 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY
2.07, at 761-65 (14th ed. 1940).
95. The language of § 406(6) which limits Chapter XII to non-corporate entities
"who [are] the legal or equitable owners of real property . . .which is security for
any debt," 11 U.S.C. § 806(6) (1970), means that "[it is not necessary ...
that the
debt be owing by the person seeking relief under Chapter XII." 9 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY
2.07, at 763 (14th ed. 1940).
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the type of debts that may be affected severely limits its otherwise apparent flexibility.
As opposed to the current law, both proposed revisions
render any individual, partnership or corporation which resides, has a place of domicile or business, or owns property in
the United States eligible for relief." The proposed business
rehabilitation chapter of the new law would retain existing
restrictions preventing insurance companies, banks, and the
like 7 from obtaining relief under the act and would also provide
for the specialized treatment, within Chapter 11, of railroad
corporations."
Although both versions of the proposed act would contain
only these very few eligibility restrictions, the Senate Bill does
provide for the special treatment of what its drafters refer to
as "public companies." It provides more stringent protective
measures for debtors who "within twelve months prior to the
filing of a petition for relief under [chapter 11], had outstanding liabilities of $5,000,000 or more, exclusive of liabilities for
goods, services, or taxes and not less than 1,000 security holders."" Although the special treatment afforded public compa96. Both the Senate and House versions of the proposed revision provide that
"only a person that resides in the United States, or has a domicile, a place of business,
or property in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under [the
Bankruptcy Act]." House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 109 to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 109 to 11 U.S.C.). The proposed revision defines
"person" to include individuals, partnerships and corporations, but excludes governmental units. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 101(29) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 101(30) to 11 U.S.C.).
The definition of corporation in the proposed revision is similar to the definition
contained in the current act. 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 309. Compare
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 1(8), 11 U.S.C. § (8)(1970) with House Bill, supra note 3,
§ 101 (adding § 101(8) to 11 U.S.C.) and Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding §
101(8) to 11 U.S.C.).
97. The proposed revision would exclude foreign or domestic insurance companies, banks, savings and loan associations, building and loan associations, credit unions, stockbrokers and commodity brokers from eligibility for relief under new Chapter
11. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 109(b), (c) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 109(b), (d) to 11 U.S.C.); see 1977 HousE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 318-19.
98. See note 86 supra.
99. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1101(3) to 11 U.S.C.). The bills
proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission and by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges contained a similar provision. See Trost & King, supra note 6, at 530.
However, in both of those proposals the more stringent protective procedures were
imposed upon corporate debtors with at least $1,000,000 in debt and three-hundred or
more security holders. Bankruptcy Act Revision, Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32,
before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., App. I, at 229 (1975) comparing H.R. 31 and
H.R. 32.
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nies under the Senate version is not truly an eligibility restriction, such treatment would restrict the flexible application of
the new chapter. The details of this protective treatment will
become apparent in the sections that follow dealing with the
control of the debtor's business during reorganization,100 solicitation of acceptances of the plan by creditors,'' the role of the
Securities and Exchange Commission in a reorganization proceeding, 0 and the standard of fairness required for confirmation of a reorganization plan. 03
Affecting the Rights of Secured Creditors
In addition to the differences among Chapters X, XI, and
XII with respect to eligibility for relief, there are important
differences among those chapters in the extent to which the
rights of secured creditors and stockholders may be affected.
For example, Chapter X is the most flexible of the reorganization proceedings in this area, permitting the alteration of the
rights of both secured and unsecured creditors as well as those
of stockholders.0 4 Any alteration of those rights however, is of
course, subject to a standard of fairness which requires that
senior claims be satisfied completely before junior creditors,1 5or
stockholders may participate in the reorganized company. 0
In sharp contrast to the provisions of Chapter X, "[iut is
uniformly recognized that the rights of secured creditors cannot
be affected or modified" by a Chapter XI plan of arrangement. 10 Despite this proscription, however, it is equally clear
that although a plan of arrangement may not affect the rights
of secured creditors, the ChapterXIproceeding frequently does
100. See notes 144-57 and accompanying text, infra.
101. See notes 195-210 and accompanying text, infra.
102. See notes 176-94 and accompanying text, infra.
103. See notes 229-36 and accompanying text, infra.
104. Section 216(1) of the current Bankruptcy Act provides that a Chapter X
plan of reorganization "shall include in respect to creditors generally or some class of
them, secured or unsecured, and may include in respect to stockholders generally or
some class of them, provisions altering or modifying their rights ...... 11 U.S.C. §
10.03, at 15-20 (14th ed. 1940).
616(1) (1970); 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
105. See notes 229-30 and accompanying text, infra.
106. Murphy, Restraintand Reimbursement: The Secured Creditorin Reorganization and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW. 15, 43 & n.179 (1974); see 8 COLLIER
2.07[3], at 77-79 (14th ed. 1940). This rule is based on §§ 306(1),
ON BANKRUPTCY
307, 356 and 357 of the Bankruptcy Act, which do not in any way provide for the
treatment of secured debt. 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(1), 707, 756, 757 (1970); 9 COLLIER ON
7.05[41, at 30-32 (14th ed. 1940); Murphy, supra at 43; see, e.g., SEC
BANKRUPTCY
v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 452 (1940).
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have an impact upon their rights.' 7 The arrangement proceeding can affect those rights via the automatic stay provisions of
section 314 of the Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Rule 11-44,
which, taken together, prevent creditors, including those holding security, from enforcing their rights during the pendancy
of the Chapter XI case.'"' The stay may be lifted however, and
the debtor will thereby be denied use of the secured property
if the creditor cannot be provided with protection against the
loss of the value of the collateral during the arrangement proceeding.0 9 The rights of stockholders, also not literally permitted to be affected by the Chapter XI plan,"10 are similarly affected by the automatic stay."'
Chapter XII, it will be remembered, is available only to
non-corporate entities which own real property that is security
107. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, Part I at 247; Anderson, Secured Creditors: Their Rights and Remedies Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 36 LA. L.
REv. 1, 1 (1975).

108.

Section 314 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that
[t]he court may

. . .

enjoin or stay until final decree the commence-

ment or continuation of suits other than suits to enforce liens upon the
property of a debtor, and may, upon notice and for cause shown, enjoin
or stay until final decree any act or the commencement or continuation
of any proceeding to enforce any lien upon the property of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 704 (1970) (emphasis added). The Chapter XI rules modify § 314 by
providing that a Chapter XI petition "shall operate as a stay" of those actions inrdicated in § 314. FED. R. BANKR. P. 11-44(a) (emphasis added). Rule 11-44(a) thus
imposes the § 314 stay automatically, rendering its removal rather than its initial
imposition discretionary and thus shifting the burden of going forward to the party
opposing the stay. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 11-44(d). See generally Anderson, Partially
Secured Creditors: Their Rights and Remedies Under ChapterXI of the Bankruptcy
Act, 37 LA. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (1977); Anderson, supra note 107, at 10; Countryman,
Treatment of Secured Claims in Chapter Cases, 82 CoM. L.J. 349 (1977); Miller,
Automatic Stay in Chapter XI Cases-A Catalyst for Rehabilitationor an Abuse of
Creditor's Rights, 94 BANKING L.J. 676 (1977); Peitzman & Smith, Secured Creditor's
Complaint: Relief from the Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy Proceedings,65 CALIF. L.
REv. 1216, 1222-23 (1977); Seidman, The Plight of Secured Creditorsin Chapter XI,
80 CoM. L.J. 343, 343-44 (1975); Werth & Reed, The Chapter XI Stay Order and the
Secured Creditor,38 OHIO ST. L.J. 33, 33 (1977); Yacos, Secured Creditorsand Chapter
XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 44 REF. J. 29 (1970).
109. There are a number of factors which determine whether the stay will be
lifted to permit the secured creditor to foreclose upon his collateral. Those factors
include whether the debtor has equity in the collateral, whether the delay caused by
the stay will impair the value of the collateral, whether the collateral is necessary for
the operation of the debtor's business, and whether there is a realistic possibility of
formulating a successful arrangement between the debtor and his unsecured creditors.
See Anderson, supra note 107, at 15-20; Countryman, supra note 108, at 350; Peitzman
& Smith, supra note 108, at 1224-33; Seidman, supra note 108, at 347; Werth & Reed,
supra note 108, at 37-46.
110. See Blum & Kaplan, Affecting Rights to Equity Interests Under Chapter
XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 978, 981-82.
111. Id.
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for any debt." 2 Quite the opposite of a Chapter XI plan of
arrangement, a Chapter XII plan must have as its primary
purpose, the modification or alteration of those obligations
which are secured by the petitioner's real property." 3 As long
as the plan is consistent with this primary purpose, the plan
may, in addition, affect the rights of unsecured creditors."'
Since corporations are ineligible for relief under Chapter XII,
however, the rights of stockholders are not in issue.
Just as in the area of eligibility requirements, proposed
Chapter 11 significantly alters the present treatment accorded
creditors. It eliminates all restrictions upon the types of interests which may be affected by a plan of reorganization. Both
revisions provide that a Chapter 11 plan may "impair or leave
unimpaired any claim or interest.""' Thus, a plan under proposed Chapter 11 may affect any debt, whether secured or
unsecured, as well as any equity interest."' The manner in
which those debts and interests are affected, of course, will
remain subject to the "fairness standard" of the proposed revision, and all parties will continue to be entitled to at least what
they would have received in a liquidation of the debtor." 7 However, the ability to affect secured debt in the single reorganization chapter of the proposed act provides a flexibility that currently is available only in the otherwise restrictive Chapter X.
The proposed revision retains a modified version of the
automatic stay provision of the current Bankruptcy Rules and
provides both a procedure and a standard for the court to use
in determining whether to modify or terminate the stay.11
See text accompanying notes 94-95, supra.
9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 2.02, at 756 (14th ed. 1940).
114. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 461(3), 11 U.S.C. § 861(3) (1970); 9 COLLIER ON
8.04, at 1069-70 (14th ed. 1940).
BANKRUPTCY
115. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1123(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1123(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.). A claim or interest is
impaired by the plan if it alters the "legal, equitable [or] contractual rights" of the
112.

113.

holder of a claim or interest, unless the alteration of those rights is otherwise cured or
compensated for. See House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1124 to 11 U.S.C.);
Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1124 to 11 U.S.C.).
116. Trost & King, supra note 6, at 531.
117. See notes 229-36 and accompanying text, infra.
118. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 362 to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 362 to 11 U.S.C.). The types of actions that would be
forestalled by the automatic stay are the same under both bills. The scope of the stay
is clarified in the proposed revision, expanding its coverage in some areas and contracting it in others. 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 174. In particular, the bills make
it clear that actions by government agencies, in the enforcement of the agency's police
or regulatory power, would not be stayed. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding §
362(b)(4) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 362(b)(4) to 11
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Upon the formal request of a creditor, the stay can be removed
or altered after a noticed hearing,"' however, if the court does
not affirmatively order the continuance of the stay within 30
days after the creditor's request for relief, the stay will be terminated automatically. 2 0 Both versions also provide, upon a
showing of irreparable damage, for an ex parte grant of relief
from the stay. 2 '
The standard for relief in a noticed hearing, however, is
only that "cause" be shown.'12 In addition to this nebulous
standard, however, both versions provide that the burden is on
the debtor or trustee to justify continuance of the stay and that
"the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property"
held by the party seeking relief constitutes cause for the relief
sought.'23 Although both versions indicate how adequate protection can be provided,' 4 the Senate bill goes on to require
relief from the stay whenever "the court finds that the debtor
has no equity in the property subject to the stay," whether or
not adequate protection can otherwise be provided. 25
In addition to the automatic stay, the proposed bills proU.S.C.); see 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supranote 10, at 174-75 & 175 n.4. The bill also makes
it clear that any "setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the [chapter 11] case" is stayed. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding
§ 362(a)(7) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 362(a)(7) to 11
U.S.C.); see, e.g., Ben Hyman & Co. v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 423 F. Supp. 1006, 100910 (N.D. Ga. 1976); see generally 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 174-75, 34044; Trost & King, supra note 6, at 537-38.
119. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 362(d) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 362(d) to 11 U.S.C.). For a proposed redrafting of this
provision see Peitzman & Smith, supra note 108, at 1256-62.
120. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 362(e) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 362(e) to 11 U.S.C.). To continue the stay beyond the 30
day period the debtor must attend a preliminary hearing and at least show that there
is a "reasonable likelihood that the [debtor] will prevail at [a] final hearing." House
Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 362(e) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, §
101 (adding § 362(e) to 11 U.S.C.). This provision restricts the current practice of some
bankruptcy courts of simply refusing to hold a hearing on the termination of the stay
and thereby endangering the value of the secured party's collateral. See Trost & King,
supra note 6, at 538.
121. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 362(f) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 362(f) to 11 U.S.C.).
122. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 362(d) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,

supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 362(d) to 11 U.S.C.).
123. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 362(d) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 362(d) to 11 U.S.C.).
124. See notes 132-36 and accompanying text, infra.
125. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 362(d) to 11 U.S.C.). Such a rule
could, however, render rehabilitation impossible where the property sought by a creditor is essential to the business of the debtor. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 4,
at 856758 (statement of John J. Creddeon).
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vide, in nearly identical sections, for the debtor's use, sale or
lease of the property of the estate.' Although notice and a
hearing are required before any such treatment of the debtor's
property outside the ordinary course of business,'27 there are
fewer restrictions upon its use or sale when such action is in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business.' Important to creditors is a requirement that the debtor in possession or trustee
notify any secured party before selling or using any inventory,
accounts, or other property which may be easily dissipated and
that such property may only be used or sold for five days after
such notice unless the court thereafter authorizes the treatment of the property sought by the representative of the estate. 129
The only difference between the two proposed bills in this
area deals with the requirements for a sale of property free and
clear of any interest claimed by a third party. Both bills require
one of a number of alternate qualifying criteria which are designed to protect the interest of the third party claimant. 3 ° The
Senate bill, in addition, requires that the property be sold at a
"fair upset price and on not less than 30 days notice" to the
adverse party. 3 ' The effect of this additional provision is to
help ensure the protection of secured creditors whose interests
may be lost or impaired if they are unable to prevent the sale
or use of their collateral.
126. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 363 to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 363 to 11 U.S.C.); see generally 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 181-83, 344-46; Trost & King, supra note 6, at 538-43.
127. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 363(b) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 363(b) to 11 U.S.C.).
128. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 363(c) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 363(c) to 11 U.S.C.).
129. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 363(c) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 363(c) to 11 U.S.C.). The notification requirement is
designed to enable a secured party to move quickly to protect his interest. 1977 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 10, at 182.
130. Those criteria permit the sale of property free and clear of any third-party
interest in the property if:
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and
clear of.such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be
sold is greater than the aggregate value of such interest;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding,
to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.
House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 363(f)(1)-(5) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra
note 4, § 101 (adding § 363(fO(1)-(5) to 11 U.S.C.).
131. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 363(f) to 11 U.S.C.).

588

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

As with creditors seeking relief from the automatic stay,
secured creditors can prevent the sale or use of their collateral
whenever it is necessary to provide adequate protection of their
interests.' Under the House bill, adequate protection can be
provided by making periodic cash payments,'33 providing additional or alternative security, granting the creditor an administrative priority claim or any other relief which would protect
the secured party's interest.'34 The Senate bill however does
not include the latter two methods,'35 reflecting a fear that any
method other than the first two would result in an increased
3
risk to secured creditors.

1

PROCEDURE DURING THE FORMULATION OF A PLAN

Eligibility to Propose a Plan of Reorganization
Aside from eligibility for a particular reorganization proceeding, the current law places certain restrictions, within each
chapter, upon which of the parties may formally propose a plan
of reorganization or arrangement. Under Chapter X, when a
trustee is appointed, 37 only the trustee, the creditors, and
stockholders have a right to make the initial proposal of a plan
132. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 363(e) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 363(e) to 11 U.S.C.).
133. Cash "rental payments" have been recognized in the past as a method of
reimbursing secured creditors for any economic depreciation of collateral left in the
hands of a debtor during reorganization. In In re Bermec Corp., the debtor was permitted to retain equipment needed to operate its business in return for periodic payments
that were to compensate the secured party for any actual depreciation of the secured
property. In re Bermec Corp. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L.REP. (CCH) 64,
065 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1971), aff'd, 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971). In an earlier case,
however, the same circuit court of appeal affirmed a federal district court judge's
refusal to require such payments. In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 384 F.2d 990, 992 (2d
Cir. 1967), aff'g from remand after 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966). Countryman, supra note
108, at 351, 353; Festersen, EquitablePowers in Bankruptcy Rehabilitation:Protection
of the Debtor and the Doomsday Principle, 5 CREIGHTON L. REv. 221, 239 (1972);
Murphy, supra note 106, at 32-36; Murphy, Use of Collateral in Business Rehabilitations: A Suggested Redrafting of Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 63
CAUF. L. REV. 1483, 1494-95 (1975); Rosenberg, Beyond Yale Express: Corporate Reorganizationand the Secured Creditor's Right of Reclamation, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 509
(1975).
134. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 361 to 11 U.S.C.); 1977 HousE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 338-40.
135. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 361 to 11 U.S.C.).
136. 1977 Senate Hearings,supra note 4, at 705 (statement of Edward J. Kulik).
137. In Chapter X of the current law, a trustee must take over the debtor's
business where there is over $250,000 in debt. Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556
(1970). Otherwise, it remains within the discretion of the court whether to appoint a
trustee or to continue the debtor in possession. Id.; FED. R. BANKR. P. 10-202(a). See 6
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
7.05 at 1198-1202 (14th ed. 1940).
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of reorganization.'38 Under Chapter XI, the debtor has the sole
right throughout the arrangement proceeding to propose a plan
of arrangement,'3 9 and in Chapter XII, both the debtor and
creditors may propose plans for consideration by the court and
the creditors.4 0 Thus, eligibility to file a plan varies with each
chapter of the current law.
Under both versions of the proposed revision, however, the
initial eligibility of the parties to propose a plan turns on
whether a trustee is appointed. When a trustee is appointed, "
then "[any party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditor's committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trus,,.2 If the debtor is allowed to remain
tee, may file a plan .
in possession during the reorganization proceeding, these parties in interest can propose a plan only if the debtor fails to file
a plan within 120 days of the order for relief or is unable to
acquire the acceptances of the requisite number of creditors
within 180 days from such date. "3 Thus, both versions of the
proposed revision grant the debtor the exclusive right to file a
plan unless a trustee is appointed or unless the debtor is unable, after a specified time, to formulate or acquire the creditors' approval of a plan.
Control of the Debtor's Business During Reorganization
Under the current bankruptcy act, the choice of the type
of reorganization proceeding often dictates whether and under
what circumstances a trustee will be appointed to control the
debtor's business during the reorganization proceeding. The
alternative to the appointment of a trustee is to continue the
debtor in possession of the estate and allow him to manage the
138. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 7.33, at 1292-93 (14th ed. 1940). COLLIER, however, continues to suggest a theory, arising under the debtor's "right to be heard on
all matters arising in a [Chapter X] proceeding .... ," under which the debtor is
entitled to propose a plan even before the trustee has that right. Id. at 1293. (quoting
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 206, 11 U.S.C. § 606 (1970)).
139. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 306, 11 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
140. FED. R. BANKR. P. 12-36(a), (b); see 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 8.01, at 1062
(14th ed. 1940).
141. See notes 144-57 and accompanying text, infra.
142. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1121(c)(1) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1121(c)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
143. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1121(c)(2) and (3) to 11 U.S.C.).
Both the 120 and the 180 day periods, however, can be extended or reduced upon a
showing of cause at a noticed hearing. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1121(d)
to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1121(d) to 11 U.S.C.).
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business as well as to control the reorganization effort.
Under Chapter X, a trustee must be appointed where there
is over $250,000 in debt, '" and may be appointed when the debt
is below that benchmark.'45 Under Chapter XI, on the other
hand, the debtor continues in possession, unless either, "a trustee in bankruptcy had been previously appointed"'4 6 or "unless
there is some reason for the appointment of a receiver.""'4 Similar to Chapter XI, Chapter XII contemplates the continuation
of the debtor in possession of the estate in most cases.'48 Thus,
the retention or removal of the debtor's management in favor
of a trustee or receiver, under existing law, is largely controlled
by the choice of reorganization proceeding. 4 '
The House and Senate versions of the proposed revision,
however, differ with respect to the circumstances under which
such protection is deemed appropriate. The House version provides, upon request of a party in interest and after a noticed
hearing, for a balancing test to determine the need and value
of an independent trustee. The law, thus revised, would require
the court to weigh the need for "the protection afforded by
a trustee" against "the costs and expenses of . . .the protection [so] afforded."' 50 Although the section is "not intended
to [establish] a strict cost/benefit analysis,"' 5 ' it does clearly
require the court to consider the cost of appointing a trustee to
manage the debtor's business.'52
The Senate version, on the other hand, adopts an amended
version of the foregoing balancing standard for nonpublic companies and requires the appointment of a trustee in cases dealing with public companies.' 53 With respect to nonpublic companies, the Senate version requires, in addition to the balancing standard in the House bill, that a trustee may be elected
"for cause shown."' 54 It remains unclear whether this showing
requires something more than the showing, already required,
144.

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970); see 6 COLLIER ON
7.02, at 1183-88 (14th ed. 1940).
145. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970); see note 78, supra.
146. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5.09[9], at 570-71 (14th ed. 1940).
147. Id. 5.09[11, at 566.
148. See Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. BANKR. P. 12-17.
149. Trost & King, supra note 6, at 534.
150. House Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1104(a) to 11 U.S.C.); see 1977
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 232-34, 402-03; Trost & King, supra note 6, at 53435.
151. 1977 HoUsE REPORT, supra note 10, at 403.
152. Id.
153. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1104(b) to 11 U.S.C.).
154. Id.
BANKRUPTCY
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55
that "the protection afforded by a trustee is needed,"' however, it appears that this additional language is a mere restatement of the balancing standard already required by both bills.
In conformity with the pattern evident in the Senate version of the proposed revision, S. 2266 makes the appointment
57
of a trustee'5 6 mandatory in cases involving public companies.
Thus, any business with more than $5,000,000 in debt and more
than 1,000 security holders, finding itself in Chapter 11 of the
Senate version of the proposed revision would also find itself
saddled with an independent trustee whether or not the protection afforded by such trustee can be shown to be needed or
worth its expense. In effect then, the Senate version contains
a legislative conclusion that a trustee is both needed and costeffective in cases involving public companies, whereas the
House version would leave that determination up to the bankruptcy courts on a case-by-case basis.

Creditor's and Equity Holder's Committees
Although creditor's committees, formulated as representatives of larger numbers of creditors, are recognized in all three
reorganization proceedings,' Chapter XI alone provides for
their selection and designates their powers and rights during
the reorganization proceeding.'59 Both versions of the proposed
revision would retain the creditors committee's "functions of
6' 0
investigation, consultation and negotiation."' In addition, the
committee would continue to be a party in interest with the
right to appeal. 6 ' The creditor's committee will also be given
the right, in a departure from existing practice, to formally
155. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1104(a)(1) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1104(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
156. In cases involving non-public companies the Senate bill provides for the
election of the trustee by the creditors, whereas the House version would require the
court to appoint a trustee. Compare Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1104(b)
to 11 U.S.C.) with House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1104(a) to 11 U.S.C.).

157.

Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1104(a) to 11 U.S.C.). This

provision has been generally criticized by those favoring a flexible reorganization proceeding. See, e.g., 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 585 (statement of Patrick A.
Murphy).
158. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5.48[4], at 724 (14th ed. 1940); see 1977 HousE
REPORT,

supra note 10, at 235.

159. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 339, 11 U.S.C. § 739 (1970).
160. Trost & King, supra note 6, at 536.
5.48[1], at 721 (14th ed. 1940); cf. SEC v.
161. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
310 U.S. 434 (1940) (SEC permitted to
Co.,
United States Realty & Improvement
intervene and appeal the propriety of a Chapter XI petition).
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propose a plan of reorganization to the court. 6 2 Although "[i]t
is not expected that the committee would often exercise this
right,"' 63 the fact that it retains the power to do so is expected
to render the "debtor more sensitive to the desire of creditors"
during the formulation of a plan.6 4
Despite the equivalent powers granted to the creditor's
committees by both versions of the proposed act, the Senate
and House bills differ greatly over the manner for selecting
members of the committees. The House version dictates the
appointment, by the court, of a central creditor's committee
which:
shall ordinarily consist of the persons that hold the seven
largest claims against the debtor of the kinds represented
on such committee, or of the members of a committee
organized by creditors before the order for relief under
[Chapter 11], if such committee was fairly chosen and is
representative of the different kinds of claims to be represented. 6 '
The House version then provides an avenue for any party in
interest to challenge the membership of a committee on the
basis that "such committee is not representative of the differ-

ent kinds of claims or interests to be represented."'' 66

Alternatively, the Senate version, maintains the policy
existing under the current bankruptcy act, in favor of allowing
the creditors to elect their representatives from among their
number.' This committee, however, must consist of at least
three members "each of whom holds an allowable unsecured
claim against the debtor."'6 8
162. Unless a trustee is appointed, however, the debtor is given the first opportunity to propose a plan of reorganization. See notes 137-43 and accompanying text,
supra.
163. Trost & King, supra note 6, at 536.
164. Id.
165. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1102(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.). If a
committee of stockholders is appointed, such committee will also "ordinarily consist
of the persons that hold the seven largest amounts of equity securities of the debtor of
the kinds represented" by the committee. Id. (adding § 1102(b)(2) to 11 U.S.C.). The
committees, however, are not required to consist of those persons holding the seven
largest claims or interests of the type represented by their respective committees. See
1977 HoUsE REPORT, supra note 10, at 401. Thus, if an eligible creditor or stockholder
declines membership on the committee, the court should feel free to appoint any holder
of a claim or interest which is similar to those represented by the other members of
the committee.
166. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1102(c) to 11 U.S.C.).
167. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1102(a) to 11 U.S.C.).
168. Id. This rule is consistent with the minimum of three members required
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An enactment of this provision would perpetuate the current practice of allowing creditor's committees to be elected
and would thus frustrate the Bankruptcy Commission's recommendation that the creditor's committee be appointed in order
to enhance the control which creditors will have over the reorganization proceeding.' However justified, the Commission felt
that election of creditor's committees had failed as a device to
encourage creditor participation and control over the reorganization effort.'70
Another important difference between the two bills concerns whether secured creditors may be included in the membership of the creditor's committee which has just been described. The House version excludes secured creditors from this
mandatory committee 7 ' and permits the appointment of
"additional committees of creditors . . . if necessary to assure
*..."'I' This provision
adequate representation of creditors .
to consist
committees
of
appointment
the
presumably permits
73
solely of secured creditors.'
The Senate version is less clear. It provides for the discretionary election of a committee of creditors which must contain, if elected at all, "not fewer than three creditors, each of
whom holds an allowable unsecured claim against the
debtor."' 7 4 Although the Senate bill goes on to permit the
appointment of additional committees, which may include secured creditors, it is uncertain whether the elected committee
may contain secured creditors provided the committee consists
of at least three unsecured creditors. 7 5
5.48[1], at 719under Chapter XI of the current law. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
22 (14th ed. 1940).
169. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, Part 11, at 219 n.4.
170. See Trost & King, supra note 6, at 535.
171. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1102(a)(1) to 11 U.S.C.); see 1977
HOUSE REPORT,

supra note 10, at 236.

172. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1102(a)(2) to 11 U.S.C.).
173. See id. (adding § 1102(c) to 11 U.S.C.).
174. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1102(a) to 11 U.S.C.) (emphasis
added).
175. This is an ambiguity that should be resolved prior to the enactment of the
Senate version. It is clear that because of their dissimilar interests, secured and unsecured creditors should not be on the same committee. See 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 10, at 236. It is equally clear, however, that the Senate bill could be interpreted
to permit such a result. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 576-77 (statement
of Robert J. Grimmig).
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SECURING APPROVAL OF THE PLAN FROM THE PARTIES

Once a plan of reorganization has been formulated, it must
then be submitted to the parties to the reorganization in order
to secure their approval. In addition, in Chapter X of the current law the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) plays
an important role in the approval of a plan to be submitted to
the court for confirmation. The following sections of this article
will examine first, the role of the SEC in reorganization cases
under both the current law and under the proposed House and
Senate revisions. Second, existing and proposed rules relating
to the solicitation of approvals from creditors and stockholders
will be compared. Last, this section will review the percentages
of creditors and stockholders who must accept a plan of reorganization and examine the "cramdown" rules for forcing a plan
upon a group of creditors who refuse to assent to its terms.
Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission
The SEC has traditionally played a key role in Chapter X
corporate reorganization proceedings. 7 ' Although the agency's
role is more limited in Chapter XI cases, its power to challenge
a Chapter XI petition and transfer a case to Chapter X renders
the SEC important in any reorganization case. Both versions
of the proposed revision would give the SEC a role in the reorganization of a business debtor under new Chapter 11, however,
before that role is examined, the powers and functions of that
agency under current law should be reviewed.
The hallmark of the SEC's split role under the current
Bankruptcy Act is the extent of its involvement under Chapter
X. In a proceeding under that chapter, the SEC is initially
entitled to receive a statement of the trustee's investigation. 77
Furthermore, if the debtor's schedules reveal more than
$3,000,000 in debt, "the judge must submit to the Securities
and Exchange Commission for examination and report the
plans which the judge regards as worthy."'7 The judge must
176. See generally, Hooten, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission Under Chapter X, Chapter XI, and Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 427 (1977); Katskee, The Calculus of Corporate
Reorganization-ChapterX v. XI and the Role of the SEC Assessed, 45 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 171 (1971); Comment, SEC Intervention in CorporateRehabilitation, 56 NEB. L.
REv. 635 (1977).
177. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 167(5), 11 U.S.C. § 567(5) (1970); see 6 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY
7.36, at 1300-03 (14th ed. 1940); Katskee, supra note 176, at 190.
178. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 172, 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970).
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then wait until the SEC has: 1) filed a report, 2) indicated its
intention not to file a report, or 3) failed to do either before the
expiration of a reasonable time, before he may approve a reorganization plan."' Finally, the SEC is entitled to appear at the
Chapter X confirmation hearing, when a plan of reorganization
is selected by the court.'80
In comparison, the role of the SEC in Chapter XI of the
current act is minimal. The agency is entitled initially only to
notice that a chapter proceeding has been filed.'8 ' More significant, however, is the SEC's right to object to the confirmation
of a plan of arrangement and to request a transfer of the pro-

ceedings to Chapter X.18 The bankruptcy judge may then
''enter an order dismissing the proceedings . . . unless . . . the

petition [is] amended to comply with the requirements of
Chapter X .

...

"I Whether such an order is warranted de-

pends upon "the needs to be served" in the rehabilitation proceedings.'84 Such needs include the size of the company sought
to be reorganized as well as whether the existing management
of the debtor has been guilty of any fraud or mismanagement
in regard to the corportion.1 5 If placed in Chapter X, the comprehensive role of the SEC, summarized above, then comes
into play, and the plan of reorganization submitted to the court
and the creditors then comes within the auspices of the regulatory agency as well.
At first glance, the proposed bankruptcy revisions, with
their consolidated reorganization procedures, seems to eliminate the distinctions in the current law with respect to the
Id. § 173, 11 U.S.C. § 573 (1970).
Katskee, supra note 132, at 191.
181. FED. R. BANKR. P. 11-6.
182. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 328, 11 U.S.C. § 628 (1970); FED. R. BANKR. P.
11-15. It has been suggested that the SEC, however, no longer spontaneously requests
transfer to Chapter X when a Chapter XI petition is filed by a corporation with public
investors. Seidman, supra note 108, at 345.
183. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 328, 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970).
184. General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956). There, the Court
rejected the contention of the SEC that appropriate relief could be obtained only under
Chapter X where the debtor was a corporation with publicly-held securities. Id. In a
later case, SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965), the Court again
179.
180.

struck down the SEC's persistent contention that Chapter XI could never provide
appropriate relief for a corporate debtor with publicly-held securities. Id. at 607, 61113. The Court conceded, however, that there is a general, although not absolute, rule,
that "Chapter X is the appropriate proceeding for adjustment of publicly held debt."
Id. at 613. See generally, 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 4.22, at 461-77 (14th ed. 1940).
185. Katskee, supra note 176, at 171; see SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 379
U.S. 594, 616-17 (1965).
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SEC's role in reorganization proceedings. As will be seen, however, the Senate bill, if enacted, would virtually reestablish the
current dual role of the SEC.
The House bill, which again contains no special provisions
for public companies, entitles the SEC to "appear and be heard
on any issue"'88 in a reorganization proceeding. Although the
SEC is not made a "party in interest" by the House bill, it
nevertheless has a formal right to object to the plan's confirmation,'87 however, the SEC has no right, under H.R. 8200 to
appeal from any order of confirmation.'88
S. 2266, on the other hand, establishes a dual role for the
SEC much like the one that exists under the current act. The
Senate bill grants the SEC the same benefits, save the right to
appeal, 88 that are available to a party in interest, when the
business involved in the proceedings is a non-public company. 10 In addition, as in Chapter X of the current law, in a
case involving a public company the SEC is given the opportunity to examine any plan the court considers to be "worthy
of consideration."'' The court may not confirm a plan unless
the SEC has either filed a report on the plan or failed to file a
report within the time specified for its preparation." 2 The SEC
may also appear, although not as a party in interest, if so
requested or authorized by the court in a case dealing with a
93
non-public company.

The effect of this distinction between public and nonpublic companies, and the role of the SEC that rests upon it,
amounts to a retention of the dual role of the SEC and of the
distinctions between Chapters X and XI which the proposed
revision has otherwise been designed to eliminate. This becomes particularly apparent when it is recognized that the SEC
has long argued that the proper bankruptcy proceeding for any
corporation with public debt is a Chapter X reorganization.'94
Rather than consolidate the currently existing reorganization
186.
187.
188.
189.

House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1109 to 11 U.S.C.).
Id.; 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 411.
House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1109 to 11 U.S.C.).
Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1109(b) to 11 U.S.C.).

190. Id.
191. Id. (adding § 1128(b) to 11 U.S.C.).
192. Id. (adding § 1128(c) to 11 U.S.C.).
193. Id. (adding § 1109(b) to 11 U.S.C.).
194. The SEC has consistently argued that there should be an absolute rule in
favor of reorganizing publicly held corporations through Chapter X. See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 613 (1965); 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 4,
at 621-24 (statement of Phillip A. Loomis Jr.).
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Chapters and provide a more flexible single procedure for the
rehabilitation of businesses, S. 2266, at least in this one respect, maintains and strengthens the inflexible procedures of
the past.
Solicitation of Acceptances from Creditors and Stockholders
Another important function of the SEC, under the proposed revisions, is the approval or disapproval of disclosure
statements that must be made prior to the solicitation of acceptances of the plan from those whose assents are necessary
for confirmation. In a major deviation from current law, both
versions of the proposed revision contain an elaborate,
securities-type, scheme for ensuring that acceptances of a plan
of reorganization are made on the basis of a full and accurate
understanding of the terms of the plan.
Under current law, the distinctions between Chapters X
and XI are encountered again in the rules regarding the solicitation of approvals of a plan from creditors. In Chapter X, the
court must approve a plan of reorganization before approvals
may be solicited.'9 5 However, after that approval is acquired,
''solicitation is unrestricted and committees or persons seeking
either support or rejection of the plan are free to act accordingly."' 9 In Chapters XI and XII, however, acceptances may
be obtained not only prior to the court's approval of the plan
but prior to the filing of the petition as well.' 97 Thus, the only
explicit restriction upon the solicitation of acceptances under
the current act is in Chapter X, and even there, once solicitation is permitted, there are no express restrictions in the bankruptcy act upon the tactics which may be employed to obtain
the requisite number of acceptances.'
The proposed revision, departing from the policy of the
current law, contains an elaborate disclosure requirement,
which if fulfilled, provides the debtor with a safe harbor against
allegations of securities fraud in connection with its solicitation
195.

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 176, 11 U.S.C. § 576 (1970); FED. R. BANKI. P.

10-303(f), 10-304; see 6

COLLIER

ON BANKRUPTCY

7.39, at 1321-28 (14th ed. 1940). The

court can authorize solicitation of approvals prior to approving the plan, but the power
is rarely exercised. Id. at 1326 n.18.
7.39 at 1324-25 (14th ed. 1940).
196. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
197. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 §§ 336(4), 436(4), 11 U.S.C. §§ 36(4), 36(4) (1970);
8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5.23 at 614-16 (14th ed. 1940); S. DONNELLY, M. DONNELLY,
G. HIRscH & S. KRAUSE, BANKRUPTCY, ARRANGEMENTS AND REORGANIZATIONS 156 n.141

(1972).
198.

See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

9.20, at 318-21 (14th ed. 1940).
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campaign.' 9 As in other areas of the proposed act, however, the
Senate version provides special provisions, similar to those in
Chapter X of the current law, applicable to cases involving
public companies.
The House version permits solicitation before or after the
petition is filed, but applies a different set of rules to prepetition and post-petition solicitation of acceptances. 0 Acceptances solicited prior to the filing of the petition are valid
if the solicitation was either "in compliance with any applicable nonbankruptcy law, rule, or regulation governing the adequacy of [such a disclosure]"" °' or, in the absence of such a
regulation, if the solicitation was preceded by a disclosure of
"adequate information." '02
Although "adequate information" is also the standard to
be applied to post-petition solicitations of acceptances, the
House version of the revision requires the court to rule on
whether the information disclosed is adequate prior to its dissemination.0 3 The information disclosed must contain both "a
summary of the plan and a written disclosure statement," ' 4
the adequacy of which is to be determined solely according to
the standard in Chapter 11.05 Thus, acceptances may not be
199. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1125(e) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1125(e) to 11 U.S.C.); see 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note
10, at 229. Both versions thus provide that:
a person that solicits, in good faith and in compliance with the applicable
provisions of this title, or that participates, in good faith and in compliance with the provisions of this title, in the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of a security, offered or sold under the plan . . . is not liable, on
account of such solicitation or participation, for violation of any applicable law, rule, or regulation governing the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase
of securities.
House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1125(e) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note
4, § 101 (adding § 1125(e) to 11 U.S.C.) (emphasis added). The revision would amount
to a codification of the Supreme Court's ruling in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976) requiring some element of bad faith as a prerequisite for civil liability
for securities fraud. See 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 230.
200. See generally Trost & King, supra note 6, at 547-50.
201. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1126(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1126(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
202. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1126(b)(2) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1126(b)(2) to 11 U.S.C.).
203. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1125(b) to 11 U.S.C.). The court's
ruling is to be on the adequacy of the information released with the solicitation, rather
than on the merits of the plan itself. See 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 226.
204. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1125(b) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1125(b) to 11 U.S.C.).
205. See House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1125(d) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1125(d) to 11 U.S.C.). However, other regulatory
agencies, such as the SEC, "may be heard on the issue of whether a disclosure state-
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solicited after the petition has been filed unless a summary of
the plan and a written disclosure statement, both approved by
the court, have been transmitted to creditors and stockholders
whose acceptances have been solicited.
The "adequate information" standard, applicable to both
post or pre-petition solicitations requires the transmission of
information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is
reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of
the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books and
records, that would enable a hypothetical reasonable
investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the
plan."'
In order to provide flexibility, "Itihe disclosure section permits the disclosure required to different classes to differ, .. .
but requires the disclosure to each member of a particular class
to be the same.

20 7

The Senate version, as indicated earlier, adopts a different
procedure in cases involving public companies. Although the
Senate has adopted the House's adequate information standards, S.2266 goes a step further requiring the SEC report, or
a summary thereof, to accompany the other materials that
must be transmitted to any class whose acceptance is solicited."0 In addition, the Senate bill also prohibits any solicitation, in cases involving public companies, prior to obtaining
the court's approval of the plan of reorganization. 09 Thus, the
Senate bill has rejected the motion apparent in its House counterpart that creditors and stockholders of publicly held companies can arrive at "an informed judgment of their own, rather
ment contains adequate information." House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding §
1125(d) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1125(d) to 11 U.S.C.).
206. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1125(a)(1) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1125(a)(1) to 11 U.S.C.). This definition of adequate
information was designed to provide the type of flexibility needed to provide adequate
information to all types of creditors and stockholders, representing, on a case-by-case
basis, varying degrees of sophistication. See 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 22627.
207. 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 227; see House Bill, supra note 3,
§ 101 (adding § 1125(c) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding
§ 1125(c) to 11 U.S.C.).
208. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1125(f) to 11 U.S.C.).
209. Id. The Senate version then, as it applies to public companies, is a reenactment of the disclosure requirements of Chapter X which requires court approval of the
plan prior to solicitation.
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than having the court or the [SEC] inform them in advance
of whether the proposed plan is a good plan."210
Approval of Creditors
As in other areas of the current Bankruptcy Act, the particular reorganization chapter under which the debtor is proceeding dictates the rules concerning the percentage of creditors who must approve the plan prior to its confirmation by the
court. In Chapters X and XII, a two-thirds majority in amount
among each class of creditors must approve a plan which is to
be submitted to the court for confirmation."' In Chapter XI,
however, only one-half of each class of creditors, in number and
amount must approve the plan."'
Under the proposed revisions, the approval of each class of
creditors and stockholders is required, unless under the plan
the claims or interests of the unaccepting classes are unimpaired. 13 The requisite percentages of approval by each member of a class of creditors or stockholders, in the proposed revisions, although the same under both bills, represents a change
from the current law. Each class of holders of claims,"' when
required to accept the plan, must do so by at least a two-thirds
majority in amount and more than one-half in number. 21 A
class of interests," ' on the other hand, is deemed to have accepted a plan when it is accepted by two-thirds in amount
among the members of a class of the holders of such interests.,'
Together, these are large acceptance requirements 25 and
closely resemble the more demanding standards of Chapter X
of the current law.
210. 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 226.
211. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 179, 468(1), 11 U.S.C. §§ 579, 868(1) (1970).
212. Id. § 362(1); 11 U.S.C. § 762 (1970).
213. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1129(a)(8) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1130(a)(9) to 11 U.S.C.).
214. A creditor or an indenture trustee can be the holder of a claim. See House
Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 501(a) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, §
101 (adding § 501 to 11 U.S.C.).
215. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1126(c) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1126(c) to 11 U.S.C.).
216. An equity security holder is the holder of an interest which may be filed.
House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 501(a) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note
4, § 101 (adding § 501(a) to 11 U.S.C.).
217. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1126(d) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill,
supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1126(d) to 11 U.S.C.).
218. Presentation by George Triester, Seminar for Bankr. Judges Conducted at
the Federal judicial Center, Kansas City, Mo., April 27-29, 1978.
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Cramdown Rules
As indicated above, the approval of each class whose
claims or interests are impaired, is normally required before
the court may confirm a plan. However, the proposed revision,
like Chapters X and XII of the current law provide for the
confirmation of a plan over the objection of a dissenting class
of creditors. The so-called "cramdown" provisions of the House
and Senate bills are very different from each other as well as
from the current law, with the differences in the Senate bill
concentrating on the treatment of public companies.
Under current law, a plan of reorganization, under Chapters X or XII, may be approved over the objections of a class
of affected creditors if the plan provides for the "adequate protection" of the members of the dissenting class."1 9 That protection can be provided via one of four methods outlined in both
Chapter X and Chapter XII of the current law. They include:
a) [T]he transfer or sale, or by the retention by the
debtor, of such property subject to such claims; b) A sale
of such property free of such claims, at not less than a fair
upset price, and the transfer of such claims to the proceeds
of such sale; c) Appraisal and payment in cash of the
value of such claims; or d) by such method as will, under
and consistent with the circumstances of the particular
case, equitably and fairly provide such protection ...."I
These methods of providing adequate protection for dissenting
creditors are the same in Chapter X as they are in XII,11 however, there is no similar procedure in Chapter XI of the current
act.
An important effect of the consolidation of Chapters X,
XI, and XII into new Chapter 11 would be the availability of
the cramdown provision of the new act to all reorganization
proceedings. Although the cramdown sections of the two versions of the revision are different, both would nevertheless permit a plan to be confirmed over the objection of a dissenting
class of creditors.
The House version provides that the members of a nonassenting class of creditors or stockholders may have the plan
219.
(1970).
220.
221.
1940).

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 216(7), 461(11), 11 U.S.C. §§ 616(7), 816(11)
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 461(11), 11 U.S.C. § 861(11) (1970).
10.12-.17, at 51-86 (14th ed.
See generally, 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
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confirmed over their objections provided that the dissenting
class is treated fairly."22 Classes of secured creditors whose
claims are impaired but who have not accepted the plan of
reorganization must, in order to be treated fairly, "receive or
retain . . . property of a value . . . equal to the allowed
amount" of their claim.22 3 This same rule applies to dissenting

classes of unsecured creditors, who however, may receive less
than the allowed amount of their claims if junior creditors receive nothing.2 In effect then, the cramdown provision requires an application of the absolute priority rule to any dissenting class of creditors."' This same rule is applied to dissenting classes of equity holders." 6
The Senate version adopts this same scheme for the treatment of dissenting classes of creditors and shareholders of nonpublic companies but provides a different standard applicable
in cases involving public concerns. That standard requires
"adequate protection for the realization of [the] claims or
interests,"2 7 of the dissenting class, and thus appears to adopt
the requirements currently applicable in Chapter X cases.22
The most significant effect of this rule, applicable only to public companies, is that it further distinguishes the two tracks
within proposed Chapter 11 and makes it appear, more and
more, to be a re-enactment of Chapter X of the current law.
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONFIRMATION OF A PLAN

The Fairness Standard
In addition to the necessary approvals from the creditors
222. See 1977

HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 412-18.
223. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1129(b)(1)(B)(iii) to 11 U.S.C.);
Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1130(c)(1)(B)(iii) to 11 U.S.C.); see 1977
HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 413-15.
224. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1129(b)(2) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1130(c)(2) to 11 U.S.C.).
225. See 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 413.
226. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1129(b)(3) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1130(c)(3) to U.S.C.); see 1977 HousE REPORT, supra
note 10, at 413-14, 417-18.
227. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1130(b) to 11 U.S.C.).
228. The "adequate protection" required by the Senate's cramdown provision is
not the same adequate protection that is required in order to continue the automatic
stay or for the debtor to continue to use a secured party's collateral. See House Bill,
supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 361 to 11 U.S.C.); Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding
§ 361 to 11 U.S.C.). It is unclear whether the Senate's failure to make § 361 of the new
title 11 applicable to its cramdown standard was merely an oversight or whether it
represents an intentional retention of the existing protection standard required in
Chapter X. See notes 219-21 and accompanying text supra.
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and equity holders, the bankruptcy act contains substantive
legal criteria to be applied before a plan is confirmed by the
court for implementation. In Chapter X of the current law the
proposed plan of reorganization must be "fair and equitable," '29 which has been interpreted to impose a rule of
"absolute priority" in the satisfaction of claims and interests
held by creditors and stockholders. The rule of absolute priority requires that each claim be satisfied in full, in accordance
with its contractual priority, before any subordinate claims are
satisfied at all.131 Chapters XI and XII, on the other hand,
require only that the plan be "in the best interests of creditors '" 3 which has been applied to require that, under the plan,
the creditors receive at least what they would have received in
2 32
a straight bankruptcy liquidation.
The proposed revision, in response to the Bankruptcy
Commission's suggestion that the absolute priority rule be
abandoned, adopted a modified version of the best interests
test to be applied in all cases under new Chapter 11. As has
often been the case, however, the Senate version of the proposed revision has adopted the standard that now exists in
Chapter X for application to public companies.
The House version's fairness standard is closely tied to its
cramdown provision, already discussed. If all classes of creditors and equity holders accept a plan of reorganization then the
best interests standard applies and operates to require that any
dissenting creditor, within a class that has approved the plan,
be given at least what would have been received "if the debtor
' If any
were liquidated under Chapter 7.'233
class of creditors
has failed to approve the plan by the required percentages then
the cramdown provision can be asserted against the members
of that class only if under the plan, they will receive an amount
equal to the allowed amount of their claims. If they receive less
than that full amount, the plan must not permit a creditor,
229. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 221(2), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1970); see 6A COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY
11.06 at 204-34 (14th ed. 1940).
230. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); see COMMISsION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 254-55.
231. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 99 366(2), 472(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 766(2), 872(2)
(1970).
232. See, e.g., Bartle v. Markson Bros. Inc., (In re New York Home Finishing
Corp.) 314 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 1963); see generally 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
9.17,
at 281-86, 9.07[3], at 1137-40 (14th ed. 1940).
233. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1129(a)(7)(B) to 11 U.S.C.);
Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1130(a)(8)(B) to 11 U.S.C.); see Trost &
King, supra note 6, at 553-56.
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junior to those in the dissenting class, to participate in the
reorganized company."' Thus, if all classes of creditors and
stockholders accept the plan, the best interest rule applies;
however, the absolute priority rule applies to any class which
does not accept the plan.3 '
The Senate version adopts the foregoing set of rules in
cases involving nonpublic companies. However, in cases involving public companies, the plan would have to be "fair and
equitable," and thus the absolute priority rule would apply."
As in other areas of the Senate's bill then, the proposed revision
would effectively reenact the fairness standard of Chapter X of
the current law and apply it across the board to publicly held
companies.
Feasibilityof the Plan
All three Chapters of the current Bankruptcy Act require
that the court be satisfied that a plan is "feasible" before such
plan can be confirmed. 237 However, this requirement has taken
on a different meaning in Chapter X than it has in the other
two reorganization Chapters. Under Chapter X, the feasibility
requirement "is concerned with the economic soundness of the
proposed financial structure of the plan . . .,,211 and requires
that the debtor will "emerge in a solvent condition with reasonable prospects of [sic] financial stability and success.""2 9 In
Chapters XI and XII, on the other hand, feasibility refers to the
"probability that the creditors will receive the amount . . .
provided for them pursuant to the plan, and not that there is
probable prospect of the debtor's future financial rehabilitation
' 240
and continued business success.
Here, both versions of the proposed revision adopt the
same feasibility standard, which is patterned after the test
provided in Chapter X of the current act. Under proposed
Chapter 11 it must be determined that "[c]onfirmation of the
plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need
234. See text accompanying notes 222-28 supra.
235. Trost & King, supra note 6, at 556.
236. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1130(a)(7) to 11 U.S.C.).
237. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 221(2), 366(2), 472(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 621(2),
766(2), 872(2) (1970).

11.07, at 235 (14th ed. 1940).

238.

6A

239.

In re Barlum Realty Co., 62 F. Supp. 81, 87 (E.D. Mich. 1945); see 6A

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

11.07, at 235
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
240. 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY
9.1811], at 287-91.

(14th ed. 1940).
9.07[3], at 1139-40 (14th ed. 1940); See id.
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for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or
reorganization is proposed in the plan." 4 ' Thus, the proposed
revision would require the court to conduct the close examination of the value of the debtor's business that such a determination demands.u2
Liquidation Rather than Rehabilitation
Under the existing Bankruptcy Act, the court has the authority, on a number of grounds, to transfer a reorganization
case to a liquidation proceeding. Although the grounds differ
among the three Chapters, they generally include failure to
obtain confirmation of a plan,4 lack of prosecution,24 failure
to consumate a plan which has been confirmed, 245 the revocation of confirmation for fraud,249 or termination of the plan due
247
to the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan.
Both versions of the proposed revision would retain most
of those grounds for transfer of a reorganization case to Chapter
7 for liquidation. 28 The Senate version would add "continuing
loss to or diminution of the estate of an insolvent debtor",49 and
the "absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation, ' '21 to
the list. These last two contingencies, however, appear to be
already covered by the feasibility requirement and the denial
of confirmation that would result upon a finding of infeasibility.
CONCLUSION

The enactment by Congress of either H.R. 8200 or S. 2266
would result in a number of important changes in the law of
bankruptcy reorganizations. In many areas, the enactment of
either version would yield the same result. Both versions give
241. House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1129(a)(10) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1130(a)(11) to U.S.C.).
242.

See 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 11.07, at 236-39 (14th ed. 1940).

243. FED. R. BANKR. P. 10-308(a)(1)-(4), 11-42(b)(3), (4), 12-41(b)(3), (4).
244. Id. 11-42(b)(1), 12-41(b)(1). There is, however, no similar provision in the
Chapter X rules.
245. Id. 10-308(a)(5), 11-42(b)(5)(A), 12-41(b)(5)(A).
246. Id. 11-42(b)(4), 12-41(b)(4).
247. Id. 11-42(b)(5)(B), 12-41(b)(5)(B).
248. See House Bill, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 1112(b) to 11 U.S.C.); Senate
Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1112(b)(3)-(10) to 11 U.S.C.).
249. Senate Bill, supra note 4, § 101 (adding § 1112(b)(1) to 11 U.S.C.).
250. Id. (adding § 1112(b)(2) to 11 U.S.C.).
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the bankruptcy courts expanded jurisdiction to resolve matters
currently relegated to litigation in state courts. In addition,
both the House and Senate bills would change the current law
related to the property of the estate and the trustee's or debtorin-possession's powers to recover previously transferred property for the use of the reorganized business. More closely related to reorganization proceedings in particular are the
changes from the current law in the areas of eligibility for relief,
both voluntarily and involuntarily, and the treatment of the
rights of secured creditors.
Apart from these particular areas, the most striking
changes in the law of bankruptcy reorganization that would
result from the enactment of H.R. 8200 or S. 2266 arise from
the merger of the existing three reorganization chapters into a
single proceeding applicable to all business entities and designed to provide business debtors with whatever type of relief
is necessary to give them a fresh start. Between the two proposed revisions, however, the House version departs further
from the current law and is generally more flexible than the
proposal suggested by the Senate. In particular, the Senate
version's specialized treatment of public companies would inhibit the flexibility of the new reorganization chapter and is in
many ways closely akin to the restrictive features of Chapter
X of the current law.
The Senate version's insistence, for example, upon the
appointment of a trustee, and the resulting loss of control by
the debtor, in cases involving public companies, is very similar
to the current rules for the appointment of a trustee under
Chapter X. The House version, on the other hand, provides for
a more flexible standard, allowing the court to retain the
debtor-in-possession of the business and thus avoiding the
added expense of a trustee where the protection so provided is
either unwarranted or prohibitively expensive, whether or not
the debtor is a publicly held company. The public or private
nature of the securities of the debtor would presumably be a
factor, under H.R. 8200, in determining whether a trustee's
appointment is warranted, but it would not necessarily be the
conclusive factor that it would be under both S. 2266 and current Chapter X.
The Senate version also adopts what is tantamount to a
reenactment of Chapter X in its rules relating to the role of the
SEC and the solicitation of acceptances from creditors in cases
involving public companies. More importantly, the Senate version's imposition of the absolute priority rule-through the fair
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and equitable standard, upon all public companies indicates
that the Senate's version is a consolidation of Chapters X and
XI in name alone.
The House version contains many of the protective procedures of the Senate bill, but unlike the latter proposal, permits
the court to determine when they should be imposed, according
to the needs and circumstances of each case presented. This
discretion would result in a more flexible law designed to rehabilitate financially troubled businesses in the most economical
and expeditious manner possible. Whatever the outcome of the
dispute over the status of the bankruptcy courts, the authors
strongly encourage the Senate to adopt the flexible reorganization procedures of H.R. 8200.

